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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL

T. MOORE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.

Civil No. 16672

BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY, a Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action by a business invitee for
damages sustained as a result of injuries suffered while
using an unreasonably dangerous radial arm saw upon
defendant's business premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
David K. Winder, District Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in
July of 1978.

The jury returned a verdict finding that

both plaintiff and defendant were negligent but further
finding that only defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.

The jury awarded plaintiff

$34,892.00 in special damages and $110,000.00 in general
damages.

Thereafter, on July 28, 1978, the court entered

judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
-1-
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Burton Lumber
verdict.

&

Hardware Co. in accordance with the jury

Defendant's motion for new trial was denied

by the court on August 21, 1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent Paul T. Moore seeks affirmance of the
lower court judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal is primarily concerned with whether or
not the court erred in refusing to give a portion of
defendant's proffered instruction:; relating

to (1) defen-

dant' s duty to warn a business invitee of obvious dangers
associated with use of its radial arm saw,

(2) plaintiff's

alleged assumption of risks connected with use of the said
radial arm saw, and (3) the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries.

Appellant's statement of facts omits much

information of significance to this appeal and further
contains certain errors which could prejudicially affect
its outcome.

Plaintiff therefore deems it necessary

and appropriate to supplement and clarify said statement of
facts as follows:
During approximately a two-year period from June 1973
to May 1975, plaintiff Paul T. Moore supervised a large
building project for Deal Development Company at Salt Lake
City, Utah.

(R • a t

669 • )

In Connec tion with said building

project, the Deal Development Company had an open account
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with the defendant Burton Lumber Company which was used in
charging hardware items and odds and ends purchased for the
job.

(R. at 645.)

It was estimated by Buddy Prince, one

of the employees of Deal, that prior to May 1, 1975, he
had patronized the defendant Lumber Company about three
times per week, spending an average of $25.00 to $50.00
per visit on needed i terns.

at 645.)

(R.

By May 1, 1975, the major carpentry work at the
construction site had been completed and most subcontractors had left.

(R. at 670.)

However, some "pickup work"

remained to be done, including enclosing some air conditioning ducts with wood blocks.

( R. at 6 4 4 , 6 7 0 • )

In

order to complete this remaining work, Mr. Moore and Mr.
Prince decided to ask Burton Lumber Company whether they
could use the company radial arm saw to cut some two-byfours into the size blocks they needed.
672.)

(R. at 644, 671-

The two-by-fours were being stored at Intermountain

Lumber Company near the railroad tracks where they had
been off-loaded.

(R. at 671.)

On May 1, 1975, shortly before noon, the two men
drove in a pickup truck to Burton Lumber Company.

While

Mr. Prince picked up needed hardware items for the job,
Mr. Moore inquired at the desk about the saw.
673, 831, 838.)

(R. at 644,

According to Mr. Moore, he was told by

the employees at the desk, that if the yard man was not
using the saw, it was all right for him to use it.
-3-

(R. at
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67 4.)

The charge for cutting was left open and was

to be
(R. at

added to the Deal Development Company account.
67 4.)

Appellant Burton Lumber claims that only employees
were allowed to use its radial saw.
at 4.)

(Brief of Appellant

Omitted is the fact that rebuttal witness Stanley

Smith,who was not employed by defendant, testified to
having used the radial arm saw in question six or seven
times and to having done so with permission.

(R. at 960-

961.)

According to Mr. Moore, he went into the yard where
he spoke with a :yardman named Jessie, and explained that
he had been given permission to use the saw if it was not
being used.

{R. at 675.)

Since Mr. Moore did not know

where the saw was, Jessie took him to the saw shed and
showed it to him.

{R. at 675.)

At that time, the saw

was in a ripping position, whereas Mr. Moore needed it set
for crosscutting.

He, therefore, arranged with Jessie to

have the saw rotated while he and Buddy Prince went to get
their two-by-fours.

(R. at 676.)

He agreed to give Jessie

a six-pack of beer if the saw could be rotated while they
were gone.

{R. at 647, 676.)

Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince

then left the yard to get their lumber, promising to
return in five or ten minutes.

(R. at 676.)

Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince went immediately to Intermountain Lumber Company where they got the two-by-fours
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that they needed.

(R. at 647, 677.)

On their way back

to Burton Lumber, they stopped at a small store where they
bought the six-pack of beer which Mr. Moore had promised
to the yard man, Jessie.

(R •

at 6 4 7 - 6 4 8 , 6 77 - 6 7 8 • )

The

beer was placed in a bag in the back of the pickup truck.
(R. at 677.)

Mrs. Moore noticed that it was still there a

week after the accident
law suit

had occurred.

which is the subject of this
(R.

at 973.)

Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince returned to Burton Lumber
Company and reentered the lumber yard the way they had
left, whereupon they park.ed their pickup truck near the
door to the shed where the radial arm saw was located.
(R. at 648-649, 678-679.)

(Attempts by appellant to infer

a surreptious motive in parking the truck so as to hide
it [See Brief of Appellant at 6], are unsupported by the
evidence.) Mr. Moore noticed that the saw had been turned
from the ripping position to the crosscutting position.
(R. at 679.)

Therefore, while Buddy Prince brought lumber

in, Mr. Moore measured the length he wanted to cut the
boards and drove a nail into the table for use as a fixed
gauge so that he would not have to measure each cut
separately.

(R. at 650, 651, 679-680.)

Mr. Moore started the saw and cut the first two-byfour by placing the end of the board against the nail
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and returning it, then
knocking the cut block out of the way, and moving his two-5-
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by-four up to the nail gauge to repeat the process.
757-758.)

(R. at

This procedure was duplicated approximately

seven to nine times without Mr. Moore letting go of the
saw.

(R. at 758.)
When he finished cutting the first two-by-four as

described above, Mr. Moore pushed the saw all the way back
to its return position, released it, and went to the end
of the table to get the second two-by-four.

(R. at 757,

He took hold of the second two-by-four with both

760.)

hands and moved it along the table in front of a one-byfour which served as a guide, toward the nail gauge which
he had earlier placed in the table.

(R. at 760-762.)

He

testified that while he was moving the board past the blade,.
[the board] remained in front of the one-by-four guide at all
times.

(R. at 760.)

His hands never slipped nor moved

from the one-by-four, and his thumb did not raise off
the board at any time.

(R. at 761.)

While thus working,

Mr. Moore momentarily directed his attention to the nail
gauge on the table to make sure his board abutted it, when
suddenly he felt the saw grab his thumb and yank it into the
blade.

(R.

at 762.)

Before he could pull his hand away

from the saw, the thumb, index and middle fingers of his
right hand had been completely amputated, and his right
and little fingers had been severely cut, though not
completely separated from his body.

(R. at 733.)

Plaintiff called as his expert witness, Mr. Louis

-6-
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c.

Barbe, a safety engineer and certified safety professional

whose credentials were presented to the court.
601; 609.)

(R. at 599-

Contrary to the statement in appellant's

brief that Mr. Barbe had no experience in operating
similar radial arm saws,

(Brief of Appellant at 7), Mr.

Barbe testified that he had operated and tested such
equipment all his life.

(R. at 609.)

Mr. Barbe testified that he examined and observed
the saw in question subsequent to the injury to Mr.
Moore.

(R. at 602.)

It was established through his

testimony, and through the testimony of Mr. Robert Burton, Vice
President of Burton Lumber, that the radial arm saw in
question had not been tilted or equipped to prevent the
cutting head from moving out on the arm away from the
column as a result of gravity or vibration.
606; 618-619; 814.)

(R. at 604-

It was also clearly established that

the saw blade had not been equipped with proper safety
guards.

(R. at 604; 607-610; 616-618; 814-815.)

Expert

witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant agreed that
these conditions violated minimum safety standards and
made the saw defective and unreasonably dangerous.

(R. at

611-622, 956-958.)
Appellant suggests in its brief that Mr. Barbe thought
the saw was dangerous for lack of guards alone.
of Appellant at 6.)

Such was not the testimony.

(See Brief
Mr.

Barbe testified that the danger was a result of the absence
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of guards and the violation of minimum safety standards
I

including those designed to prevent spontaneous movement
of the cutting head.

(R. at 604-606; 618-620; 621-622.)

The latter condition resulted in the saw having a tendency
to spontaneously creep or drift out from its return
position.

Mr. Barbe testified that this was so.

(R. at

604-606.)

Vernon Campos, employee of Burton Lumber,

corroborated the fact that the saw had a tendency to creep
when running.

(R.

at 931-933.)

Paul Moore testified that he was not aware of this
tendency.

{R. at 762,792.)

No one testified that the

creeping tendency of the saw was open, obvious, plainto-be-seen, or in any way apparent to a first time user.
In fact, the majority of defendant's employees testified
that they did not know the saw crept.

(R. at 823, 824, 826;

854, 856; 871.)
After several days of testimony, the matter was
submitted to the jury on special interrogatories.

The jury

found that both parties were negligent but that plaintiff's
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries.
at 1024.)

(R.

Defendant's negligence was found to be the

proximate cause of the injuries and damages were assess~
accordingly.

(R. at 1024-1025.)

Judgment was entered for plaintiff as aforesaid
in accordance with the jury verdict.

(R.

at 428-429.)

·
Fo 11 owing
unsuccess f u 1 posttri' al moti' ons, defendant Burton
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Lumber brought this appeal alleging error in the Court's
instructions and error by the Court for failing to direct
a verdict against plaintiff on the proximate cause question.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ON DEFENDANT'S
DUTY TO ITS BUSINESS INVITEES WERE NOT ERRONEOUS,
NOR WERE THEY PREJUDICIAL IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
Burton Lumber Company first argues for a reversal of
the trial court's judgment in this case based on alleged
errors by the Court in instructing the jury as to the
duty of the lumber company toward a business invitee.
Burton claims that the jury should have been told there
was no duty to warn of an obvious danger.
In deciding an appeal based on such a claim, three
factors must be taken into consideration:

(1)

It must

be established that the court's instruction was in fact
erroneous;

(2) Once established as erroneous, the

instruction must be shown to have been prejudicial to
the outcome of the case and to the rights of the appealing
party; and (3) The party claiming error and prejudice must
meet the burden of proof as to both aspects of such a
claim.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated this general

proposition of law as follows:
What the parties are entitled to and the
law seeks to afford is an opportunity for one
claiming a grievance which would justify legal
-9-
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redress to present it to a court or jury and t h
0
t ria
· l .
·
·
·
a f air
Wh en this
is
done and the verd' ave
·Judgment are entered, all presumptions
'
ana
are in ict
f
·
l
·
d
·
avor
f
th
o
eir va i ity.
The burden is upon the
appellant not only to show that there was error
J;iut that it was_pre~udical to ~he.extent that there
is reasonable likelihood that in its absence the
would have been a different result.
re
Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah
2d 94, 348 P.2d 935, 938

(1960); Cf. Gilhespie v. DeJong,

520 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1974); Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288
(1972); Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d
301, 470 P.2d 399, 402

(1970).

In the present case, defendant/appellant, Burton Lumber
Co. has not met its burden of proof of showing error in the
instructions,

nor of showing prejudice to its rights or

to the outcome of the case.

These points are more fully

discussed hereinafter.
A.

The Court did not err in refusing to instruct the

jury on defendant's responsibility to a business invitee
concerning an obvious danger because there was no evidence
that the dangerous condition of the saw in question was
obvious.
Respondent Paul Moore does not deny that, as a general
proposition of law, an owner or occupier of land does not

have a duty to warn his business invitees of dangers which '
are open or obvious.

However, in order for a defendant to

·
rely on sue h a d oc t rine
as a defense to an action against
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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him, and be entitled to a jury instruction thereon, that
defendant must present evidence to justify application
of the theory.

The Utah Supreme Court has said:

It is well recognized that the parties are
entitled to have their theories of the case presented
to the jury in the form of instructions, but only
if they are supported by the evidence.
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc. 567 P.2d 174, 176
(Utah 1977).
The above principle was applied in Bruner v. McCarthy,
105 Utah 399, 142 P.2d 649

(1943).

There, a railroad

worker's leg was amputated when he fell from a train which
his fellow worker had moved suddenly and unexpectedly.

The

defendant trustees of the railroad appealed the injured
worker's successful action against them,claiming that the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense
theory of contributory negligence was reversible error.
Defendants postulated that they should have been entitled
to such an instruction because plaintiff picked the most
dangerous way he could have to do his task.

The Supreme

Court noted that "one difficulty with this position is that
the record does not support it."

Id. , 142 P.2d at 651.

Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
The present case is analogous to Bruner.

Here,

Burton Lumber postulates that the radial arm saw in question
was dangerous for lack of safety guards and safety guards
alone.

It reasons that since the absence of such guards
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was open and obvious to a user of the saw,
relating to its lack of duty was in order.

·
an instruction
A

·

sin~,

however, the record does not support Burton's position.
The record clearly shows that the real danger of
the saw to Mr. Moore was the fact that its cutting head
had a tendency to drift spontaneously out from the return
position while the saw was running.
931-933.)

(R. at 604-606;

The absence of proper safety guards only

compounded the danger that such a condition posed to an
unsuspecting user of the saw, since there was nothing to
keep vulnerable hands and fingers from being caught and
cut by the drifting blade.

(R. at 610.)

Why Burton

Lumber has so carefully omitted all reference to this
danger from its brief is not known.

Nonetheless, such

an omission deprives its arguments of whatever validity and
legitimacy they might otherwise have claimed.
Evidence showing the true nature of the danger posed
by the saw was not sparse.

Expert witness Louis Barbe

testified that (1) the saw lacked appropriate guards
and (2) was not mounted or equipped to control movement
of the cutting head along the arm therefore resulting
in a tendency for it to move spontaneously toward an
operator while it was running.

(R. at 604, 606, 618-619.)

Defense witness Vern Campos agreed that the saw had a
tendency to creep.

(R. at 933.)

Mr. Campos also indicated

that such movement was rather erratic and inconsistent. (R'
931-935.)

Photographer Scott Heslop also testified that
.. 12 ..
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even when not running, the saw drifted out from its return
position.

(R. at 965.)

Mr. Barbe testified that minimum safety standards in
1975 (including those promulgated by the American National

standards Institute) required, as a minimum, that radial
saws be equipped with certain types of safety guards
which defendant's saw did not have,

(R. at 615-618), and

that the saw be positioned or equipped so that the cutting
head would not roll or move out on the arm away from the
column
619.)

as a result of gravity or vibration.

(R. at 618-

It was clear from testimony of Robert Burton,

Vice President of Burton Lumber, that no effort had been
made to comply with either of these minimum safety
requirements.

(R. at 825-826.)

Mr. Barbe, as well as the expert testifying for the
defense both stated that the condition of the saw in reference
to the above safety requirements made it defective and
dangerous.

(R. at 620; 956-958.)

Mr. Barbe added that

in his opinion Mr. Moore's injuries were caused by the
said defective condition of the saw.

(R. at 621-622.)

It

is clear from the full text of Mr. Barbe's testimony that
he was not isolating the absence of guards as being the
sole factor causing injury to Mr. Moore, but, rather, was
blaming the injuries on the lack of guards together with
the fact that the saw had a tendency to creep.
Though there was ample evidence to show the creeping
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tendency of the saw, there was no evidence introduced
at any time to support an allegation that the danger
therefrom to Mr. Moore was open or obvious.

In fact,

all evidence tended to show the latent nature of the
danger.
Mr. Robert Burton, employee of Burton Lumber for
thirty years, said he thought the saw stayed put when
pushed back.

(R. at 825-826.)

Larry Hester, a yardman

for Burton Lumber and user of the saw, testified that h~
impression was that the saw did not move even a fraction
of an inch when pushed back.

(R. at 856.)

Jessie Garcia,

yardman for Burton Lumber, said he had never seen the
saw move.

(R. at 871.)

Paul Moore said the only way he

knew the saw would move was "to grab the handle and pull
it out."

(R. at 762.)

On the strength of such evidence, and none showing
the contrary, there was no way the jury could have found
that the dangerous condition of the saw was open or
obvious to a business invitee.

In fact, an instruction

including provisos relating to questions of obviousness
may even have been confusing and misleading to the jurors.
The Court did not err in instructing the jury as i t did.
B.

When the jury instructions are read as a whole,

they show that defendant's duty to a business invitee was
properly explained and no error was corrunitted.
It is a clearly established proposition of law that
-14-
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in determining whether or not a trial court has fairly
presented the issues of a case to the jury, the instructions
will not be examined fragmentally nor in isolation. but will
be considered as a whole.
621, 622 (Utah 1977).

Black v. McKnight,

562 P.2d

The fact that a requested instruction,

though it correctly states the law, is not given, does not
constitute error, if the substance thereof was given in
instructions of the court,

(Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah

143, 239 P.2d 215, 219 (1951)), or if the jury is otherwise sufficiently advised of the issue it is to determine.
In

re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542, 545

(1956).

See also Ewell and Son Inc. v. Salt Lake City

Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1972).
As stated by this Court in Gilhespie v. DeJong,
520 P.2d 878

(Utah 1974), the fact that a party is entitled

to have the jury instructed in accordance with his theory ofthecase
"does not mean that [the instruction] must be given in the
exact language chosen by him.

The requirement is met if

the basic idea contended for is explained in ordinary,
concise and understandable language."

Id. at 880.

The instructions of the trial court in the present
case, when read as a whole, show that though the court
did not employ the precise language urged upon it by
defendant concerning duties owed to a business invitee
it did instruct on such duties with sufficient clarity to avoid
conunitting error.
-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Burton complains of the Court's giving of I
· nstructior,
No.

22, which reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
If you find by a preponderance of the evid .
that, at the time of his injury, Mr. Moore was
enc,
defendant's "business invitee," as that term is
defined hereinafte~, then defendant's duty to Mr.
Moore was to refrain from any acts of negligence
toward him; to exercise reasonable care to keep
the premises, including the radial arm saw thereon
i:r:1 a cc;indition reasonably safe for purposes consis~en\
with his presence there; and to warn him of any and
all dangers involving the operation of said saw which
were known to the defendant or should have become
known to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and the performance of reasonable
inspections.

(R. at 327.)

Instruction No. 2 2 was not the only one in which the
court explained the nature of the defendant's duty to an
invitee.

In Instruction No. 21

(which was

requested~

Burton Lumber, R. at 416) the duty of a lumber yard toward
its business invitees was explained as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 21
When a lumber yard is open for business, OM
who enters i t to purchase some commodity or service,
is a business visitor or invitee.
Upon the owner of
the lumber yard, Burton Lumber and Hardware Company,
the law places the duty of exercising ordinary care
to not unnecessarily expose the business visitor or
invitee to danger or accident and keep in reasonably
safe condition the portions of the premises and .
equipment therein impliedly or expressly made ava1lab.:
for the business visitor or invitee to use.
1

(R. at 326.)

* * *

The court's Instruction No. 11 defined negligence as
"the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person
-16-
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hJve done under the circumstances of the situation,"

(R. at 316.)

Instruction No. 12 explained that a per-

son's duty to exercise caution varies. with the amount of
danger reasonably to be apprehended:
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the
ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion
to the danger known to be involved in his undertaking,
it follows that in the exercise of ordinary care,
the amount of caution required will vary in accordance
with the nature of the act and the surrounding circumstances.
To put the matter in another way, the
amount of caution required by the law increases as
does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended
increases.
(R. at 317.)
Upon examination of the whole of the instructions
relative to Burton's duty toward an invitee, it cannot
fairly be said that the jury was left to believe that
said duty included an obligation to warn of dangers
which were "readily available to the senses," or
"perfectly obvious."

Therefore, it was unnecessary for

the court to have used the precise wording requested by
defendant when giving its instructions.
In Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co.,

26 Utah 2d 448,

491 P.2d 1209 (1971), an injured plaintiff complained of
an adverse verdict on the basis of alleged errors in the jury
instructions relating to contributory negligence.

This

Court's opinion of the alleged errors is instructive:
If the language assigned as objectionable be
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excerpted and looked at in isolation there is
some plausibility to plaintiff's argument that it
might have the [adverse) effect he suggests.
However, it will be noted that it was coupled wi~
the correct ~tatement that he was obliged to take
such precautions as a reasonable and prudent per~n
would take under the same circumstances. Notwithstanding minor
. variants in the instructions , if th ey
are a 11 considered together, as they are required
to be, we think they adequately set forth the
duties of the parties and properly submitted the
issues to the jury.
Id., 491 P.2d at 1210-1211.
Here, as in Rowley, supra, there is no error that warr
upsetting the jury verdict and judgment.
C.

Comparison of the Court's instructions concerning

defendant's duties to licensees as opposed to business
invitees does not demonstrate error with respect to the
latter.
Defendant points out that the court's instruction
on duty to a licensee contains the type of language
which it sought to have included in the proposed "invitee"
instructions.

Defendant then argues that if the court

considered the language of the "licensee" instruction ~
be supported by evidence, it could not properly exclude
such language from the "invitee" instruction.

Such

argument lacks merit for two reasons.;
First, as has been shown above, the instructions,
when read as a whole, make it clear that the jury was
properly instructed concerning defendant's lack of
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duty to warn of readily apparent and patently obvious
dangers.
Second, even if the jury had not been so instructed,
the fact remains that there was no evidence to support
the alleged existence of an obvious danger.

(Supra at 13-14.)

In that sense, the Court's "licensee" instruction, as
worded, may also have been unwarranted by the facts of
this case.

In light of the outcome, however, any such

error in this regard must surely be classed as harmless.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
D.

Even if the court's instructions concerning

defendant's duty toward an invitee had been erroneous,
defendant has failed to show that they were prejudicial.
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's refusal
to give defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 (R. at
417) was error, Burton Lumber still has the burden of
showing that such error was prejudicial to it in the
sense that it resulted in substantial injustice, or
that it deprived the defendant of its substantial rights.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Utah

Supreme Court has further explained this rule as
follows:
The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse
for mere error or irregularity. We do so only if
the complaining party has been deprived of a fair
-19Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial.
The test to be applied is:
Was there
e:r;ror. or irregula:r; i ty such that there is reasonable
likelihood to believe that in its absence there
would have been a result more favorable to him?
If upon a survey of the whole evidence this
question must be answered in the negative, then
there is no justifiable basis for reversal of a
judgment.
Rowley v. Graven Brothers
1209, 1211 (1971).

&

Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P. 2d

Cf. Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake

Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 4 93 P. 2d 1283, 1288 (1972);
Hall v. Blackham,

18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 666 (19U

In the present case the jury found the defendant
negligent in its conduct toward Paul Moore.

NegligencG

was defined for the jurors as being the failure to do
what a reasonably prudent person would have done undff
the circumstances of the situation.

(R. at 316.)

The

evidence showed that the creeping tendency of the saw couL
have been eliminated by such simple acts as placing blocks
under the table legs, tilting the arm of the saw, or
attaching a weight or spring to the cutting head.
605, 638, 825-826.)

(R.

~

The evidence also showed that none of

these things had been done,despite the fact that their
accomplishment was a minimum safety requirement.
605, 618-619; 814-815; 957-958.)

No evidence indicat~

that the creeping tendency of the saw was obvious.
at 13-14 . )

(R. at

(~

There is, therefore, no reasonable likelihood

that the giving of the language proposed by defendant
in its requested instruction No. 20 concerning its lack
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of duty to warn of an obvious danger would, with any
reasonable likelihood, have changed the outcome of the
case.
A portion of the language of defendant's requested
instruction which the court refused to give spoke of the
plaintiff's duty as follows:
If there is
danger attending the entry of the
premises and the use of the equipment and if such
danger arises from conditions readily apparent to
the senses, the business visitor or invitee is
under a duty to discover the danger.
(R.

at 417.)
The only reponse favorable to defendant which the

giving of the above instruction could have evoked from the
jury, even

if there had been evidence that the creeping

tendency of the saw was obvious, would have been a finding
that plaintiff, Paul Moore, was negligent.

Since the jury

in actuality found Paul Moore negligent, it cannot be said
that the outcome of the case was prejudicially affected.

In

the absence of a showing of such prejudice the verdict of
the jury and judgment of the court should not be disturbed.
POINT II
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK WAS NOT
ERRONEOUS NOR WAS IT PREJUDICIAL IN LIGHT OF THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAi.~CES OF THE CASE.
The second error of law which defendant Burton Lumber
claims was committed by the trial court sterns from the
court's refusal to give defendant's requested instructions on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the doctrine of assumption of the risk.

(R. at 408-410.)

The same general legal principles discussed in Point
supra, apply here.

That is, the burden is on Burton

I,
Lumbe:

to show that the court's action in this re ad
g r was erroneou,
and that said erroneous conduct, if any, was prejudicial
to the outcome of the case and to defendant's substantial
rights.

(See supra at 9-10, for authorities cited.)

As will be discussed below, the court did not err in
refusing defendant's prof erred instructions because (1)
the evidence does not support the application of the
assumption of risk doctrine;

(2) the Utah Comparative

Negligence Statute authorizes the court's rejection of the
assumption of risk doctrine under the circumstances of
this case; and (3) even if defendant's primary/
secondary assumption of risk approach were to have been
adopted, the evidence would not have warranted its
application in this case.
Furthermore, even if the failure to instruct on
assumption of risk principles had been error, no prejudice
resulted from such failure because of the state of the
evidence presented and the lack of any reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the case would have been changed.

A.

The court did not err in refusing to instruct ;E_e

jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk, due to the ~
that there was insufficient evidence presented to have
sustained such a defense theory.

-22-
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Before the affirmative defense of assumption of risk
can be applied, the defendant relying thereon must introduce evidence that the plaintiff intelligently and
deliberately,
voluntarily),

(sometimes referred to as freely and
consented to assume a risk which was

both known to him and appreciated by him.
Clayton~mb~rt

See Smith v.

Manu!_actur:i_:_IJ_'I__Co., 488 F.2d 1345 (10th

cir. 197 3); Erne!:';,t W:. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.,

601

P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Hindmarsh v. O. P. Skaggs Foodliner,
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968); Ferguson v. Jongsma,
10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404

(1960); Johnson v. Maynard,

9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); Kuchenmeister v. Los
Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725, 729 (1918) 1 ;
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§496D, 496G (1965).
It is important to note that in Utah, for a plaintiff
to be held to have assumed a risk, he must be shown to have
been aware of it specifically.

In Foster v. Steed, 23 Utah

2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court
approvingly quoted Dean Prosser in saying that '"The fact that
the plaintiff is fully aware of one risk

* * *

does not mean

lThe language of the Kuchenmeister case is illustrative
of the language generally used by the Court:

" (B] efore he

may be charged with having assumed the risk,

[a plaintiff]

must not only have fully understood and appreciated the
danger, but he, in the very face of danger, must voluntarily
have assumed
the risk of injury." Kuchenmeister, 172 P.2d at 729.
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that he assumes another of which he is unaware
Id. at 1022-1023,

n. 4,

[citing

W.

* * *.

111

Prosser, Handbook of

U

~

Law of Torts 464

(3d ed. 1964) .]

Similarly, in Ferguso

---·~

v. Jongsma, supra, the court said, "Assumption of risk
requires knowledge by plaintiff of a specific defect or
dangerous condition .

"

Id. at 411.

(Emphasis adde:.

Such principles apparently grew out of the decision in
Johnson v. Maynard, supra, wherein the court held that it
was error to instruct on assumption of risk where the
evidence did not show "that plaintiff was aware of the
particular danger involved .

II

Id. at 887.

(Emphas!

added.)
The particular danger out of which Paul Moore claims
his injury arose was not that of being cut by the blade of
an unguarded radial arm saw, as defendant would have this
court believe.

Rather, it was the danger of being cut by

such a saw because of its unknown tendency to creep out
spontaneously and unexpectedly from its return position.
The saw's tendency to creep out from its return
position has already been discussed.

(Supra at 12-13.)

Also discussed above was the absence of any evidence
indicating that this creeping tendency was known to or
observable by Paul Moore.

Most of Burton Lumber's officers

and employees said they were unaware of the creeping tendenc
of the saw, despite their history of using it.

(Supra atH·

e board, and
Mr. Moore, wh o h a d on 1 y Used the Saw to Cut On
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in so doing had held onto the handle of the saw the whole
time, could not have been expected to know about or
discover the drifting tendency.

(See R. at 757-758.)

Rather

than show that Mr. Moore knew of the saw's dangerous
propensities, such evidence tends to show affirmatively
that he did not know and could not have known of them.
In the absence of evidence that Mr. Moore knew of the
saw's dangerous tendency to creep, it cannot be alleged that
he appreciated that danger.

Neither can it be said that

he intelligently or deliberately consented to assume the
resulting risks associated with the saw's operation.

Thus,

assumption of risk principles do not apply in this case.
A question similar to the one discussed above was
raised in a diversity case tried in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.

McGrath v. Wallace

Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974).

There, the

plaintiff was injured when an abrasive disc mounted on a
grinding wheel which he was using, disintegrated.

Plaintiff

had not been using the guard which had been furnished with
the wheel.

From a jury verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff, defendant appealed.

One of the grounds for the

appeal was the commission of alleged error by the trial
court in failing to submit the case to the jury with
instructions on assumption of risk.

Though the case was

reversed on other grounds, with respect to the assumption
of risk question the Tenth circuit Court of Appeals ruled
-25-
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that "the trial court properly refused to give the
instruction on assumption of the risk, since there was no
evidence that McGrath [the inJ' ured plaintiff) h ad knowledge
of a specific defect in the disc, which seems to be require:
as the basis for the defense in Utah."

Id. at 302.

Plaintiff, Paul Moore, submits that in the instant
case there was no evidence presented that he had knowledge
of the specific dangers associated with use of the
defendant's radial arm saw and that, therefore, the doctrir.'
of assumption of risk was properly excluded by the trial
court.
B.

The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute authorizes

the court's refusal to specially instruct on the doctrine
of assumption of risk under the circumstances of this case.
One of the trial court's reasons for refusing to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the
risk was its conclusion that the doctrine was comprehended
within contributory negligence concepts in a comparative
negligence case such as the present one.

(R. at 899.)

In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon the
following statute passed by the 1973 Utah State Legislature:
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - DIMINISHMENT OF DAMAGES"CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE" INCLUDES "ASSUMPTION OF THE
RISK" --Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his.legal
representative to recover damages for negl~ge~c~
or gross negligence resulting in death or in inJurY
to person or property, if such negligence was not as
negligence of the .,
g reat as the negligence or gross
.
h
b t any damaa,.
person against whom recovery is soug t, u
·

-26-
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allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering. As used in this act, "Contributory
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk.P
§78-27-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

(Emphasis

added.)
Notwithstanding the express language of the foregoing
statute that "contributory negligence shall not bar recovery"
in a negligence action, and that '"contributory negligence'
includes 'assumption of risk,'" defendant argues that
assumption of risk is still a complete defense in Utah.
See Brief of Appellant at 20.

The thrust of defendant's

argument is that there are two types of assumed risk, a
primary type and a secondary type.

It is argued that the

legislature intended to include only the secondary type as
a form of contributory negligence in comparative negligence
cases.

The reasoning then follows that if the primary

type was not included, it must still be a complete bar
to recovery.

(See infra at 31-33

for a discussion of the

distinction between primary and secondary type assumption
of the risk.)
When the legislature enacted the comparative negligence
statute, it made no effort to define what it meant by
assumed risk nor did it indicate that the term was used
in any specialized or limited sense.

Multiple earlier

pronouncements of this court, however, had defined the
term as consisting simply of the voluntary and intelligent
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consent to assume a particular risk which was both
and appreciated.

(See supra at 23.)

knovm

Though it is true

that in a footnote to one of its cases2 this court
acknowledged that some commentators had recognized the
primary/secondary assumption of risk dichotomy, the court
appears never to have adopted the approach in Utah.
Indeed, the fathers of the approach have themselves
advocated its abandorunent.3
In light of the foregoing it must be assumed that
the legislature used "assumed risk" in its simple
single-tier sense and that its intent in so doing was
to eliminate the harsh effects of allowing affirmative
defenses to serve as complete bars to a plaintiff's
recovery for injuries produced in howsoever small a way

2

n. 8

Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d B, 465 P.2d 169, 172,

(1970).

3n [Q] uite aside from any questions of policy or of
substance, the concept of assuming the risk is purely
duplicative of other more widely understood concepts,
such as scope of duty or contributory negligence. The
one exception is to be found, perhaps, in those cases
where there is an actual agreement.

* * *
"Except for express assumption of risk therefore,
the term and the concept should be abolished.
It adds
nothing to modern law except confusion, "2 F. Harper
& F. James, The Law of Torts §21.8 (1956).
-28-
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by his own fault.

Dean Prosser would agree:

It can scarcely be supposed in reason that the
legislature has intended to allow a partial
recovery to the plaintiff who has been so
negligent as not to discover his peril at all,
and deny it to one who has at least exercised
proper care in that respect, but has made a
mistake of judgment in proceeding to encounter
the danger after it is known.

w.

Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 457

(4th ed. 1971)

Defendant has attempted in its brief to bolster its
primary assumption of the risk argument by citing a 1976
Oregon Appeals Court case which construed Oregon's comparative negligence statute in a way favorable to defendant's
position.

(See citation of Becker v. Beaverton School

District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976), Brief of
Appellant at 28-30.)

Defendant argues that because of

similarities between Oregon's and Utah's comparative
negligence laws, this court should rule after the fashion
of the Oregon Appeals Courts.
In 1973 the Oregon and Utah comparative negligence
statutes contained the following language:
OREGON

UTAH

Contributory negligence,
including assumption of the risk
~11 not bar recovery in an
action *~1TSuchnegITgence
contributing to the injury was
not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom
recovery is sought * * * .

Contributory neglishall not bar recovery in
an action * * * if such
negligence contributing to
the injury was not as great
as the negligence of the
person against whom recove:y
is sought * * *· As used in
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Or. Rev. Stat. §18.470
(1973). (Emphasis added.)

this . act, "contribut ory
11
incluaes--'"assumption of therisk,
§78 27 37 Utah Cod~·
1953, as a~h
added.)
P~
1
neg_~gence

The Becker court reasoned that the term

11

assumption of

the risk," as used in the Oregon statute was, because of
its grammatical location in the sentence, intended to
refer to secondary assumption of risk only, and that,
therefore, primary assumption of risk remained a complete
bar to recovery by plaintiff.

Becker, supra at 502.

Several factors make interpretation of Utah's statute
much different then Oregon's.

First, the Becker court was

constrained to apply the primary/secondary approach to
the assumption of risk doctrine because said approach had
been adopted as the law of Oregon in 196 2 by the Oregon
Supreme Court.
668

(1962).

See Renner v. Kinney, 231 Or. 552, 373 P.2d

Utah has never adopted this confusing approacn

and should not do so now.
Second, Utah's Legislature placed the term "assumption
of the risk" in a different portion of the statute than
did Oregon's.

Thus, in Utah's statute, the term was not

limited in its scope by a

confining equivalent antecedent.

Third, Oregon has now, interestingly enough, abolished
the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk except in it:
express sense, thus indicating general dissatisfaction with
the approach taken in Becker, supra.

See 1975 Or. Laws,
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ch. 599 §4; Or.Rev.Stat. §18.470 (1974).
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act has declared the
assumption of risk doctrine to be included as a form of
contributory negligence.

Therefore, in a comparative

negligence case, a trial court is not obligated to
instruct on more than one of the doctrines.

Though it

may not be error for a court to give separate instructions
on both doctrines in a proper case,

(see Rigtrup v. Straw-

berry Water Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977)), neither
is it error for a court to refuse to give assumption of risk
instructions in a case where proper contributory negligence
instructions have already been given.

Since such instructions

were given in this case, there is no reason to disturb the jury
verdict.

c.

The evidence in this case does not support the

application of primary assumption of risk principles even
if the primary/secondary assumption of risk approach were
to be adopted as the law in Utah.
Under the primary/secondary approach to the
assumption of risk doctrine, secondary type assumption
of risk is a mere form of and is legally considered
identical to the doctrine of contributory negligence.

2

F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts §21.1 at 1162 (1956);
57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence §279

(1971).

The elements of

secondary assumption of risk are acknowledged to be comprehended
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within a proper set of instructions on neg l'igence and
contiibutory negligence. Since such instructions were
in this case, defendant cannot, and presumably d

.
given

oes not cJo:.

that error was committed in this respect.
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which
defendant claims should have been applied in this case,
is not a form of contributory negligence.

It does not

involve questions of a plaintiff's conduct, but, rather,
is generally considered to be but an alternate way of
expressing the idea that the defendant owes no duty to the
plaintiff.

See Harper

&

James, supra; 57 Am.Jur.2d, supra

at §276; 6 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 244, 249-50 (1977).
There are two types of primary assumption of risk.
One which arises from a plaintiff's express consent to
relieve a defendant of a duty of care, and another which
arises from an implied consent to do the same.

Express

consent is given by agreement such as when two prize
fighters agree to a bout, or when two businessmen agree
to the sale of a piece of equipment with a known or
acknowledged defect for which the seller wishes to assume
no responsibility.
Implied consent. on the other hand, does not involve
an agreement between parties, but arises from circumstances
indicating a willingness on the part of one party to relieve
·
another of certain responsibilities toward h im.

Because the

effect of claiming "no duty" can be harsh, in order to imply
such consent as is required to trigger application of this
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doctrine, one must establish special circumstances.

The

courts and commentator's have rather uniformly required a
danger to be "open and obvious;" 4 "fully comprehended or
perfectly obvious;" 5 "obvious, .
. . . common ly know n

. customary and

. . ,. 116 or "palpable, 117 before

they have been willing to imply a person's consent to
relieve another of a duty of care toward him.

An example

of such an assumption would be where an adult puts his
fingers into an electrical outlet, or enters a line of
fire on a target range during the shooting.
Burton Lumber does not contend that Paul Moore
expressly consented to assume the risk of injury to his
hand.

Its allegations are that the danger of an unguarded

saw is so obvious that a consent which would eliminate
duty should be implied.

In making such an argument, defendant

ignores the fact that the danger associated with this saw
was not its mere lack of guards, but, rather, the tendency
for its blade to creep spontaneously away from the return
position and toward an unsuspecting operator.
pointed out, supra at

As has been

14 , such a condition was anything

4Becker v. Beaverton School District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498,
500 (Or.App. 1976.)
5Renner v. Kinn~, 231 or. 552, 373 P.2d 668, 671 (1962).
6

Harper & James, The Law of Torts, §21.2 at 1170 (1956) ·

7 53 Or.
L. Rev. 79, 81 ( 1973) .
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but obvious.
No evidence of obviousness was introduced at trial.
The evidence that was introduced with respect to

the saw's

tendency to creep showed this dangerous tendency to be
latent.

There simply was no basis upon which a question

concerning obviousness could be argued to have arisen in
the present case.

The court, therefore, acted properly

in instructing the jury as it did.
Defendant's citation of this Court's holding in
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P.~
1247

(Utah 1977), as authority for its position1 is inappositi

The facts in Rigtrup are wholly different from those of the
present case.

There, the plaintiff had been

informed of the inadequacy

specific~~

of his electrical system, had

been warned of the likelihood of power interruptions and
the need for backup generators, had experienced power
outages as a result of such interruptions, had been

~M

that his system was improperly wired, and had even had his
system fail due to such faulty wiring.

The risks connected

I

with a power outage could be said to have been so obvious tol
him under the facts of the case, as to absolve the power
company of any duty to prevent outages to him.
In the present case, however, there was no evidence
that Paul Moore knew of the radial arm saw's tendency to
creep.

Neither was there any evidence to show that Mr.

Moore had been informed of the saw's tendency to creep or
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had witnessed or experienced the phenomenon before.
Minimum standards for radial arm saws required that they
be so mounted or equipped as to prevent any independent
or spontaneous forward motion of the cutting head.
Undisputed evidence showed violations of those minimum
standards.

Clearly it cannot be said under the circumstances

of this case that defendant was entitled to have the court
instruct the jury on assumption of the risk in its
primary sense.
D.

Even if the Court's refusal to separately instruct

the jury on the assumption of risk doctrine had been
erroneous, defendant has failed to show that said refusal
was prejudicial.
As has been fully discussed above, in advocating
reversal of a jury verdict because of alleged errors in
the instructions, an appellant must show not only error,
but also prejudice.

(Supra at 19-20.)

The measure of

prejudice is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
in the absence of the "error" the result would have been
more favorable to the complaining party.

Rowley v. Graven

Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971).
Assuming that the court had instructed the jury on
assumption of risk, the result of this case would only have
been altered if the jury had found that the dangerous
creeping tendency of the saw was known or should have
been known to Paul Moore.

The absence of any evidence to
-35-
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support such a conclusion has already been pointed
{Supra at 13-14.)

out.

It cannot be said that there is any

reasonable likelihood that the outcome of this case

Ws

prejudicially affected by the actions and decisions Of the
Court.

The jury's verdict should stand.
POINT III

THERE IS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONTENTIONS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OR EVEN A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
HIS INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Burton Lumber claims that Paul Moore was negligent
in (1) using its radial arm saw without first adjusting
the hood guard, and {2) placing his hands in the line
of cut

of the blade. 8

Brief of Appellant at 34-37.

WheH.

the jurors relied on these factors in reaching their

~~~

will never be known.

Suffice it to say that they found

Mr. Moore negligent.

However, the jury also found that

Mr. Moore's negligence was not a proximate cause of his
injuries.

Defendant says the jury's latter finding was

incorrect.

It argues that plaintiff's negligence should

Bit is important to note that the blade guards which
Mr. Barbe referred to as being minimum safety requirements
were in addition to what defendant refers to as the ho~
guard.

Concerning said hood guard, Mr. Barbe testified

that i t was not an adequate machine guard and may or may
not have been able to keep a hand away from the saw blade.
(R.

at 632.)
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have been ruled to be a proximate cause of his injuries as a
matter of law.

In fact,

says defendant, Mr. Moore's

negligence should have been ruled to be the sole proximate
cause of his injuries as a matter of law.

Such a position

finds no support in law or logic.
In Utah, in order for someone's negligence to be
deemed a proximate cause of injury it must meet certain
criteria:

(1) it must be the primary moving cause without

which the injury would not have been inflicted,

(2) it must

operate in a natural and probable sequence of events to produce injury without intervention of what would be classed
as a supervening cause, and (3) it must be a substantial
or material factor in bringing about such injury.

See Cox

v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 (1953); Hall v.
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664

(1966).

It is apparent from their verdict that the jurors
believed the evidence that Paul Moore's hand never slipped
or moved into the saw blade when his fingers were amputated
(R. at 761.)

It is also apparent from their verdict that

the jurors believed the evidence that the saw spontaneously
and unexpectedly drifted forward from its return position
and sliced into Mr. Moore's hand while he was sighting down
the board he was preparing to cut.

It is true that if

Plaintiff's hand had not been in the line of cut of the blade,
the drifting saw would not have contacted it.

Such a fact,

however, does not compel the jury to find, as a matter of
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law, that plaintiff's hand position was a proximate

cause
of his injuries, any more than the fact that a person's
ignorant use of a car with faulty brakes compels a
finding that he is therefore

a

proximate cause of any

collision he might be in, no matter what the drivers of
other vehicles do.
In order for the jury to have been directed to find
plaintiff's hand position to be a proximate cause of his
injury as defendant urges, it would have to appear from
the evidence that reasonable minds could not differ in
concluding that by such conduct Mr. Moore played a substantial role in causing the saw to move forward and ~~
his hand; and further that said saw's movement was the
natural and probable consequence of his hand being placed
where it was.

If the evidence admitted any other

reasonable conclusion, the questions were for the jury. Giver
the state of the record, the court's submission of the issue:
to the jury was proper.
Defendant's contentions that plaintiff's negligence
(in whatsoever form the jury found it to exist) was the sole
proximate cause of his injuries, as a matter of law, cannot
pass muster.

When a jury of concededly reasonable men and

women conclude, on the basis of proper instructions, that
plaintiff's negligence was not even ~ proximate cause of
his injuries; and where the jurors are not alleged to ~w
.
. d ice,
.
and no evidence
acted on the basis of passion
or preJu
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of passion or prejudice is put forth, it stretches the
imagination to suppose that a court should declare the
opposite to be the case and then bootstrap such a declaration
into a directed verdict that the negligence was the sole
proximate cause thereof.

Defendant's argument in support

of its position is very short.

It merits only a very

short response.
The case of Velasq1.i"ez v. Greyhound Lines, ·rnc. ,
12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d 989 (1961)

(relied upon by

defendant) says that before the negligent perception of a
danger can be the sole proximate cause of an injury, the
danger must be so obvious that it cannot fail to be observed
and avoided.

Id.

366 P.2d at 991.

In the present case the

dangerous creeping tendency was latent.

No evidence of its

obviousness was presented to even raise a jury question
thereon, let alone require a determination in defendant's
favor as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the whole record in this case shows
that defendant's appeal for reversal of the trial court's
decision should be denied.
fairly and properly.

The trial was conducted

The jurors received appropriate

instructions on the law applicable to the case and their
verdict was supported by the evidence.

In any lawsuit of

several days duration, counsel can usually find something
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to complain about.

Ew:=l-.~-~!2_~--~on, -~12C:~___':'._:_~~Ske City
--~

~~~~~t:ioi:_, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 ~. 2d 1283 1 1288 (19?2).

Nevertheless, absent a showing of real error resu 1 ting in
substantial prejudice, in the sense of there being a
reasonable likelihood of unfairness or injustice, the
decision of the trial court will be sustained.

Id.

As has been pointed out above, the Court's instructio:,
on defendant's duty to a business invitee were neither
erroneous nor prejudicial for several reasons:

(1) There

was no evidence that the dangerous tendency of the saw to
creep forward spontaneously from its return position while
running was or should have been obvious to a user such as
Paul Moore; therefore, the court did not err in omitting
defendant's proffered language
its instructions.

( 2)

concerning such dangers fro:

A reading of the whole of the jury

instructions shows that jurors were properly instructed
concerning the duty of defendant to warn business inviteeSi
dangers connected with use of the saw; therefore, there was
no error.

(3)

There was no showing that defendant's right:

were substantially affected or that the outcome of the
case would, with any reasonable likelihood, have been
different; therefore there was no prejudice.
The Court's refusal to separately instruct the jury
on assumption of the risk was also not prejudicially
erroneous for several reasons;

(1)

No evidence was

introduced to prove the essential elements of the ass
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umptior

of risk theory; therefore, the jury should not have been
instructed thereon.

(2) The Utah Comparative Negligence

Statute authorized the actions of the trial judge in declining
to give defendant's proffered assumption of risk instructions.
(3)

Even if the Court were to have adopted defendant's

theory concerning the two-tier approach to assumption of
risk, there was no evidence to support its application
in this case.

(4)

There was no showing that the refusal

to separately instruct on assumption of risk affected
defendant's substantial rights or changed the probable outcome of the case.
Defendant's last complaint of error, that the evidence
was so plain against the plaintiff that the court should
have directed a verdict against him on the proximate cause
issue, is groundless.

The evidence showed not just that

plaintiff's hand was cut in a radial arm saw but also that
said saw had a latent and very dangerous tendency to
spontaneously creep forward from its return position while
running.

This dangerous condition existed as a result of

admitted violations of what both parties recognized to be
minimum safety standards.

The evidence further showed that

plaintiff had no way of knowing that this dangerous tendency
existed, and that while he was operating the saw, the
whirling blade unexpectedly drifted forward and grabbed
his hand, amputating three of his fingers and severely
cutting two others.

In the face of such evidence and more,
-41-
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defendant's argument that reasonable men and women could r,',
reach the decision that they did is untenable.
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff/Respondent

h~

Moore respectfully submits that the verdict and judgment
of the court below should be affirmed.
RESPEC·rFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of January 1

198~,

HANSEN & THOMPSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respo:
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
533-0400
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